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after 9/11,” he argues, “the Bush administration fashioned a comprehensive strategy for American domination
of the Persian Gulf and the procurement of ever-increasing quantities of
petroleum.” This “strategy of maximum extraction” involved three
goals—the stabilization of Saudi Arabia, the removal of Saddam Hussein
and his replacement with a stable government capable of substantially boosting oil output, and the escalation of
pressure on Iran in the hopes of producing a favorable leadership change
there as well.
As important and overlooked as oil has
been as a determinant of U.S. strategy
toward the region, this characterization
of the Bush administration’s policies
may appear simplistic given the various
other motives offered, such as nonproliferation, antiterrorism, and Israel’s
security. In particular, given the title of
the book, the connection between energy concerns and the invasion of Iraq
would have benefited from more thorough analysis. As it is, Klare devotes
just one page to an explicit discussion
of the administration’s oil-related motives for ousting Saddam. As indirect
evidence, he points to U.S. efforts to
seize Iraq’s oil facilities at the outset of
the war, but this overlooks the equally
plausible goal of ensuring that postwar
Iraq could finance its own reconstruction.
Ultimately, Klare’s argument is largely
structural in nature, but it is also a
powerful one that cannot be easily dismissed. As he notes in the preface,
“Since cheap oil is essential to the nation’s economic vigor, American leaders, of whatever party affiliation, have
felt compelled to do whatever was necessary to ensure that enough was available to satisfy our ever-expanding
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requirements.” As the competition for
oil intensifies, what is deemed necessary
could well be increasingly a military
response.
JOHN DUFFIELD

Department of Political Science
Georgia State University

Cronin, Audrey Kurth, and James M. Ludes, eds.
Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy.
Washington, D.C.: Georgetown Univ. Press,
2004. 320pp. $26.95

This volume is a much-needed tonic.
Attacking Terrorism—a somewhat bellicose title, since most of the articles included recognize the need for a carefully
calibrated response to terrorism—is a
diverse collection of focused and evenhanded assessments of the military,
diplomatic, economic, and legal tools
available to confront the problem.
Cronin, a terrorism specialist with the
Congressional Research Service and an
adjunct professor at Georgetown University, and Ludes, a former editor in
chief of National Security Studies Quarterly, selected their contributors well.
The diversity of expertise this volume
offers affords it a broad perspective on
counterterrorism strategies.
Lindsay Clutterbuck offers an exploration of a legal approach to combating
terrorism (including illuminating discussions of British and European Union
practices); she concludes that it is best
to combine the legal and military elements of the struggle rather than approach counterterrorism solely as a
war. Striking a similar note, Timothy
Hoyt argues that the “use of military
force may prove spectacularly unsuccessful if it is not carefully correlated
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with political objectives.” Yet he argues
that it is “indisputable” that we have
entered into a war with al-Qa‘ida. Hoyt
makes the point that the terrorists’
campaign meets Clausewitz’s definition
of a “continuation of policy by other
means,” and that the American response
will likely involve the use of military
force over “many years.” He also observes, however, that the elusive nature
of terrorist organizations raises serious
obstacles to employing military force to
counteract them.
In a well-timed essay, Paul Pillar offers
an excellent overview of the intelligence
challenges peculiar to terrorist organizations. He notes there is grave danger in a rush to reform following an
event such as 9/11. “A couple of wellpublicized mistakes . . . become the
basis for a widely expressed belief—
repeated unquestioningly by scores of
commentators—that ‘the FBI and the
CIA don’t communicate with each
other.’ ” (Ironically, Cronin echoes exactly this criticism of interagency communication in her conclusion.)
Carnes Lord offers a penetrating chapter on the opportunities and, more tellingly, the difficulties involved in what
he terms “psychological-political instruments.” While Lord is certainly correct that we must not “write off the
West’s assets in this contest,” one finds
oneself grimly concurring with Fouad
Ajami’s assessment of public diplomacy’s prospects: “It’s hopeless. We
will not get a hearing.” Lord claims the
key task is not to sell democracy but to
undermine radical Islam. Patrick
Cronin also argues that “foreign aid
triage” will certainly be of use in this regard. This aid will be urgently needed
to “strengthen general order, moderate
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institutions, and influential community
and national leaders” in order to combat terrorism over the long term.
Martha Crenshaw reviews both counterterrorism strategy and the interaction
between terrorism and security scholars
over the past two decades. She observes
that “al-Qaeda evolved under specific
and perhaps unique historical circumstances; the assumption that al-Qaeda
will be a model for future terrorism
may be incorrect.” Daniel Gouré remarks that the American homeland security strategy is “a pell-mell rush” that
lacks an obvious attempt to “provide a
risk assessment that would rank order
threats.”
Audrey Kurth Cronin herself supplies
two excellent pieces. The volume opens
with her survey of the four “levels of
analysis” of terrorism—the individual,
the group or organization, the state,
and the international system. Her structured exploration of the problem is
much needed. She rounds out the volume with a chapter on what might be
called “grand counterterrorism strategy.” Cronin calls for an assessment of
each potential target’s relative involvement in terrorism, and not a strategy
that reflexively attacks “states that do
not control the current wave of terrorism.” Our integration of counterterrorism tools is in “an extremely
primitive state.” She concludes with the
observation that “positive power” (aid,
reconstruction efforts, and image enhancement) is an essential element of a
balanced counterterrorism strategy.
“This position is not naiveté or liberalism but pragmatism.”
ANDREW L. STIGLER

Naval War College
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